This paper analyzes how scale-free resources, which can be acquired by multiple firms simultaneously and deployed against one another in product market competition, will be priced in strategic factor markets, and what the consequences are for the acquiring firms' performance. Based on a game-theoretic model, it shows how the impact of strategic factor markets on economic profits is influenced by product market rivalry, pre-existing competitive (dis)advantages, and the interaction of acquired resources with those pre-existing asymmetries. New insights include the result that resource suppliers will aim at (and largely succeed in) setting resource prices so that the acquiring firms earn negative strategic factor market profitssacrificing some of their pre-existing market power rents-by acquiring resources which they know to be overpriced.
INTRODUCTION
Scholars of the resource-based view (RBV) have been occupied with strategic factor markets (SFMs) since the publication of Barney's seminal article in 1986 (Adegbesan, 2009; Barney, 1986; 1989; Chatain, 2013; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Makadok, 2001; Makadok and Barney, 2001) . A key theme in this literature is that SFMs, while seemingly attractive to strategizing firms, ultimately serve as elusive paths to competitive advantage and superior performance if resource-acquiring firms have to pay the full economic value of the labor, technology, brands, firms, and physical assets that they purchase (Barney, 1986 (Barney, , 1988 Coff, 1999) . This insight has led scholars to embark on an ongoing quest to map the conditions under which resources will be priced at their economic value and the conditions under which SFM imperfections offer potential gateways to rents (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Makadok and Barney, 2001; Adegbesan, 2009) .
With the recent exception of Chatain (2013) , however, extant SFM models have simplified the product market conditions of the resource-acquiring firms. At the same time, one important class of resources remains virtually untouched in the SFM literature: resources that are 'scale-free' (Levinthal and Wu, 2010) so that more than one firm can potentially acquire them and use them at the same time, as is the case for many resources often associated with competitive advantage (e.g., technologies and brands). These two research gaps are related since, as shown in this paper, product market rivalry gives rise to distinct SFM outcomes when resources are scale-free. Accordingly, this paper aims to explore the impact of such rivalry on the pricing of scale-free resources and on the performance of the firms that acquire them. To shed light on these issues, it presents a formal model based on non-cooperative game theory.
The key insight emerging from this exercise is that firms will often be predictably harmed by the external availability of valuable resources-an idea that is counterintuitive, but, as argued in this paper, realistic and meaningful once the strategic interaction between them (and the behavior of the resource seller) is taken into account. In particular, the profits of resourceacquiring firms hinge on the resource seller's SFM strategies, which, in turn, are determined by the characteristics of the resource, product market, and firms. For example, when rivalry is soft and the firms are not too heterogeneous, the resource seller will price the resource so that they play a 'Prisoners' Dilemma' game for it and in the process lose economic profits. Conversely, if rivalry is strong or one firm already has a strong competitive advantage, the price will be such that only one firm acquires the resource and pays no more or less than the value of it. Finally, if the resource has a strong potential to upset the competitive balance in the product market, the resource seller may strategically restrict its capacity in order to increase the willingness-to-pay of the market leader, who will end up sacrificing profits by acquiring an overpriced resource.
The next section of the paper revisits the literatures on SFMs and product market rivalry and discusses how the current paper fits into these literatures. The subsequent section presents the assumptions of the model, followed by analyses of two types of product market rivalry (Bertrand and Cournot) and an extension capturing endogenous resource scarcity. Finally, I discuss the implications for scholars and managers and conclude.
BACKGROUND
Early SFM studies emphasized information asymmetry as a precursor to SFM rents, which may accrue to firms with superior private information about the resources in such markets (e.g. Barney, 1986; 1988; Makadok, 2001; Makadok and Barney, 2001 ). More recently, focus has shifted towards the way in which the economic value of each SFM resource varies across potential buyers (Makadok, 2001; Makadok and Barney, 2001; Adegbesan, 2009 ) and how such heterogeneity may enable firms to earn SFM rents. In all these studies, however, the mechanism by which each resource creates value is exogenous. Hence, product market rivalry is a determinant that has been touched upon in the broader RBV debate but has not yet been fully developed in the extant SFM literature. Barney (1986; 1991) originally argued that resources are valuable because they facilitate certain product market strategies. By implication, the value of a resource is not independent of the product market environment (Priem and Butler, 2001 ). An emerging stream of research is now taking important steps towards explicitly incorporating this idea into the RBV (MacDonald and Ryall, 2004; Adner and Zemsky, 2006; Costa, Cool, and Dierickx, 2013) . For example, recent papers by Makadok (2010) and Chatain and Zemsky (2011) imply that the benefits of having a resource-based competitive advantage are greater given strong product market rivalry.
However, as these papers do not extend their models to SFMs per se, they do not say much about the impact of product market rivalry when resources are not developed, but bought in markets at an endogenously determined price. This question is particularly pertinent in light of recent work suggesting that firms can harm their product market rivals when they interact in factor markets (Capron and Chatain, 2008; Markman, Gianiodis, and Buchholtz, 2009) . In particular, as demonstrated formally by Chatain (2013) , when ex ante identical product market rivals bid for a non-scale free (unique) resource, they submit bids which are above the value-in-use of that resource, because each firm is willing to pay a price premium in order to preempt the resource from being acquired by its rival and used against itself in the product market.
Despite these recent advances, two questions still remain unanswered. First, what happens when an SFM resource is not unique but scale-free (Levinthal and Wu, 2010) and can potentially be acquired by multiple rivals at the same time? Consider markets for technology: British chip designer ARM Holdings has sold its technology to 191 companies, many of whom use it to compete directly against one another (e.g. Apple and Samsung, both of whom used 32-bit ARMv7 processors in their smartphone offerings in 2012-2013). Similar dynamics take place in markets for brands, such as in the toy industry where Disney's Lucasfilm subsidiary has licensed its Star Wars intellectual property to both Hasbro and LEGO (each of whom produces, for example, its own version of Obi-Wan Kenobi and other Star Wars characters). Clearly, then, scale-free resources can be, and often are, acquired by product market rivals who deploy them directly against one another in varying instances of competition. We need to know more about how the markets for such resources work and what the implications are for firm performance.
Second, when multiple product market rivals can acquire the same resource, what will happen to pre-existing competitive asymmetries? Industrial Organization (IO) scholars have asked related questions, focusing either on the timing of technology adoption (e.g. Scherer, 1967; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985; Reinganum, 1981) or on the persistence of monopoly (e.g. Arrow, 1962; Gilbert and Newbery, 1982; Reinganum, 1983) . In the latter literature, the 'replacement effect' posits that an entrant will have a stronger incentive than an incumbent to adopt an innovation, because the incumbent realizes that the new technology cannibalizes its own existing technological strength. The 'efficiency effect', on the other hand, suggests that the incumbent will have a stronger incentive to patent an innovation than the entrant. In particular, because a monopolist makes more profits than two duopolists do, its gain from preemptively patenting the new technology and thereby remaining a monopolist is larger than the entrant's gain from patenting the technology and becoming a duopolist. Yet these models predate the RBV and as such do not explicitly model resource interactions, and they assume exogenously priced resources. Consequently, we know relatively little about the extent to which SFMs give rise to replacement and efficiency effects and the implications of this for competitive (dis)advantage and performance. This paper aims to draw out those implications with a model that bridges the IO and SFM literatures.
THE MAIN ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL
Suppose that we have an SFM in which a resource seller faces two potential buyers (henceforth referred to simply as the 'firms' or the 'rivals') operating in the same product market, where they are assumed to be either Bertrand or Cournot competitors. While the distinction between Bertrand and Cournot also indicates deeper differences in industry structure (Costa et al., 2013) , it has been used in earlier research in combination with homogenous products and cost-reducing resources as a simple but powerful instrument for contrasting high and low rivalry (e.g. which each product market rival decides whether or not to acquire one unit of the resource, and (3) a product market stage in which the rivals face an output demand curve normalized to 1 P Q   , where P denotes the product market price and Q denotes product market quantity.
1 Even if a resource is scale-free, a resource supplier may in some cases be able to commit to selling the resource to only one firm. The base model, presented in the following, assumes that such a commitment is not possible, but in a subsequent extension that assumption is relaxed. This is a sequential game, with a pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium which can be found by backwards induction, following the arrows in the figure: the firms' purchasing patterns in the second stage will depend on their expectation of the product market rivalry in the third stage, and the resource seller's pricing strategy in the first stage will depend on its expectation of the firms' purchasing patterns in the second stage. For simplicity, the time value of money is assumed away (including this would merely deflate the second stage SFM prices by a discount factor, leaving all other results and the propositions unchanged). It is assumed without loss of generality that the two firms, denoted 1 and 2, have constant marginal cost MC  , respectively, so that it is meaningful to refer to firm 1 as the 'strong firm', firm 2 as the 'weak firm', and a as the magnitude of the competitive advantage of the strong firm.
Resource Synergies. Following Adegbesan (2009 ), Makadok (2001 , and Makadok and Barney (2001) , I assume that the synergy with the SFM resource may differ among acquiring firms. Formally, this resource synergy can be captured by a firm-specific parameter i c describing the extent to which the resource can create value in combination with the assets of firm i. In particular, following Makadok (2010) , suppose that the resource from the SFM lowers the marginal costs of firm i by i c if that firm acquires it. 2 Of course, whether the value created by this cost reduction will ultimately be appropriated by the firm itself (MacDonald and Ryall, 2004; Grahovac and Miller, 2009; Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996) is a question that can only be determined when the resource-armed firm is ultimately tested by some yet to-be-specified product market competition. Hence, product market rivalry determines to what extent such an apparently 'valuable' resource will generate rents for the firm.
2 Alternatively, one could assume that the resource increases the quality of the firm's products rather than lowering its costs, but this would not substantially change the insights resulting from the model. (Arrow, 1962) and described types of technologies that unsettle market leaders by virtue of being incompatible with their pre-existing technological architecture (Henderson and Clark, 1990) . Cognitive psychologists have been interested in the extent to which new knowledge is supplantive, i.e. replaces pre-existing knowledge (Atherton, 1999) . Similarly, RBV scholars have called resources 'suppressive' or 'substitute' if they replace firms' pre-existing core competences rather than add to them (see e.g. Jeffers, Muhanna and Nault, 2008; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Siggelkow, 2002; Black and Boal, 1994) . The counter-points to these examples are incremental innovations, which tend to sustain the pre-existing competitive advantages of the market leaders (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982) , and additive knowledge which stacks on top of firms' pre-existing knowledge bases (Atherton, 1999) without cannibalizing them. In a setup without pre-existing competitive advantages, Chatain 
MC a c    .
A simple way to express the distinction between additive and supplantive resources is to say that an additive resource lowers the marginal cost of the firm that deploys it by a certain amount (c), whereas a supplantive resource lowers it to a certain level (  is the part of that profit which can be ascribed to the existence of the SFM,
This implies that the economic impact of the SFM on the resource-acquiring firm ( S  ) can be evaluated by a comparison of its profits in the (hypothetical) situation in which that SFM did not exist ( M  ), and its profits in the situation where it does exist (  ). I will show that there is a complex relationship between S  and the underlying competitive outcomes of the SFM. As shown in Figure 2 , these outcomes can take four forms: divergence when only the strong firm buys a resource so that the marginal costs levels of the two firms diverge even further;
leapfrogging when only the weak firm buys a supplantive resource so that it can leapfrog the marginal cost level of the strong firm; maintenance when both firms buy an additive resource and thereby maintain the difference in their marginal cost levels; and convergence when both firms buy a supplantive resource and converge at the same (lower) marginal cost level. Figure 2 shows the contingencies and proposition numbers that are linked to these outcomes in the models below.
*** Figure 2 about here ***
Product market monopoly: A benchmark
Before we look at the determination of SFM profits under product market rivalry, it is useful to establish, as a benchmark, how these profits are determined in the absence of product market rivalry. Hence, suppose that the two firms are potential buyers in the same SFM but sell their output in two perfectly isolated product markets where each firm enjoys a monopoly position.  and sell two units (a 'low-price' strategy). It will choose the latter only if the potential buyers are sufficiently similar, as captured by
This choice, in turn, has strong performance implications for the two firms. With the high-price strategy, only firm 1 will buy the resource, paying the full value of it in the SFM, and no one will earn SFM rents. With the low-price strategy, on the other hand, both firms will buy the resource, and firm 1 will earn SFM rents proportional to the difference between the two reservation prices. Hence, the price of the resource responds to the demand for it but does not rise all the way up to the highest willingness-to-pay. This result is similar to the one shown by Adegbesan (2010) , in which SFM rents also arose as a result of firm heterogeneity. However, the mechanism is different as, in the present model, it is the scale-free nature of the resource and the presence of the less willing-to-pay rival that lowers the optimal price of the resource supplier. In that way, heterogeneous product market monopolists may earn rents on an SFM in a way that resembles how heterogeneous consumers earn consumer surplus in a textbook competitive market: the least-willing-to-pay buyers contribute to lowering the market price below the reservation price of the most-willing-to-pay buyers.
THE IMPACT OF PRODUCT MARKET RIVALRY
The above analysis raises the question of whether SFM rents are also possible when the acquiring firms are product market rivals that may deploy the SFM resource against one another.
We therefore now introduce product market rivalry into the model. This creates a possibility that some or all of the value of a resource can be appropriated by consumers, rather than by the resource-acquiring firms. Since we have defined two types of resources-additive and supplantive-and want to distinguish between strong and weak rivalry (as captured by the Bertrand and Cournot models, respectively), there are four cases to consider, each of which will be examined in a dedicated section below. Proofs of all propositions and results can be found in the online Appendix to the paper.
Bertrand rivalry and additive resources
Following the Bertrand (1883) model, assume that both firms compete for the same consumers, who care only about the price in the product market and will therefore buy from the least expensive firm (or randomize if both firms charge the same price). This means that demand for firm 1 will be 1
P P  (and vice versa for firm 2). Each firm is assumed to have sufficient capacity to serve the entire consumer market on its own at no cost penalty, should it choose to underbid its rival. What will be the price of the SFM resource with these assumptions? The calculation of the firms' reservation prices is not as straightforward as in the monopoly case, because the price that they are willing to pay for the resource in the SFM will depend on how much of its value they expect to appropriate in the product market, while the expected value appropriation in the product market depends on the preceding resource acquisition strategy of the competitor in the SFM.
This interdependency between the resource acquisition strategies of the two firms means that game theory is needed to identify the firms' reservation prices.
To arrive at a NE in resource acquisition strategies, we first need to derive the payoffs to the firms under each combination of strategies that they may pursue. As shown in the online Appendix, if neither firm buys the resource, the strong firm can maximize its profits with a limit price, i.e. a price just below the marginal cost of its rival: What should the resource seller do? A rational resource seller realizes that the outcome of the game will depend on the price of the resource, and anticipates the two firms' responses to any price that it may charge. We can see that no positive price will induce both firms to buy at the same time (because the weak firm earns p  if they do and hence would prefer not to buy). It is possible for the resource seller to price in a way that the two firms will play a Chicken game for the resource, but this is unlikely to be optimal as it would require a relatively low price (cf. the Appendix). Hence, the best outcome the resource seller can hope for is to sell one unit of the resource to the firm with the highest reservation price. This firm turns out to be the strong firm:
given that its rival does not buy the resource, it will buy as long as   The unique NE of this game is one of divergence between the two firms: the strong firm becomes stronger while the weak firm stagnates, as shown in Figure 2 (1). This suggests that SFMs for additive resources will tend to be a source of path-dependence where an early advantage gets magnified over time. However, from a performance perspective the SFM does not change anything. The weak firm is still not able to enter the market and earns 0 as before, and, whereas the SFM resource increases the strong firm's product market rents by 
Bertrand rivalry and supplantive resources
As defined earlier, the effect of a supplantive resource is to lower the marginal cost of an acquiring firm to 1 2 a c   . When only the weak firm buys the supplantive resource, it therefore 3 The figure also assumes that
, which makes resource acquisition a dominant strategy for the strong firm. However, this has no bearing on the NE since the weak firm would in any case never acquire the resource. Like in the additive model, the two firms will not acquire the resource at the same time and we should therefore once again search for NE in which only one firm buys the resource.
However, unlike in the additive model, the weak firm now has the highest reservation price
c . This is a natural consequence of the replacement effect (Arrow, 1962) in the sense that the resource replaces the strong firm's competitive advantage, which lowers its incentive to acquire it. Accordingly, it is optimal for the resource seller to price just below the weak firm's reservation price, setting 
  
, all of which, however, are appropriated by the resource seller through the SFM price. The SFM will have a negative impact on the strong firm, which will lose its competitive advantage and associated Ricardian rents, and in the end no one will earn any profits except possibly the resource seller. These results hold for all parameter values and are thus captured by the following proposition: The supplantive Bertrand model can be seen as a description of how innovations diffused through SFMs can upset the competitive balance in an industry. An example is the book retail industry, where the diffusion of internet technologies such as ecommerce software and digital books has been a factor in the unsettling of the previous market leaders (e.g., Borders, Barnes & Noble). Arguably, the most important resources possessed by these firms-real estate and physical shelf space-have been supplanted by technologies that enable anyone to sell books in virtual rather than physical space. The leapfrogging outcome thus describes a mechanism for the decline of dominant firms (Pisano, 2006) and suggests that such decline can be triggered by the way in which supplantive resources are priced in SFMs. Conversely, we saw that when additive resources are sold in SFMs they will be priced so that they keep the weakest firms out of the market and thereby reinforce competitive advantages. Arguably, this is what has taken place in the media content industry where the aforementioned internet technologies were more additive to the competitive advantages of the strong firms (e.g. Disney and Time Warner)-advantages that are based on the production rather than distribution of content.
Irrespective of whether the resource is additive or supplantive, however, the profits of the acquiring firm do not change as a consequence of the SFM. In that sense, the Bertrand model supports Barney's prediction that the price of an SFM resource will be exactly as high as its economic value, precluding SFM rents, and show that this prediction is also valid in a game theoretic model. To be precise, the price of the resource will reflect its economic value to the firm with the highest reservation price, and this firm will acquire the resource but earn no rents on it. A comparison with the monopoly model reveals that this outcome is driven by the rivalry in the product market, because Bertrand competition, unlike monopoly, ensures that only one firm will buy the resource. This may seem surprising given the fact that it is scale-free and thus potentially could be sold to both firms at no extra cost to the resource seller. However, since it is common knowledge that two resource-armed firms will compete so strongly that at least one of them fails to earn any product market profits, they will never acquire the resource the same time, and the resource seller therefore cannot hope to sell more than one unit of the resource, regardless of how low a price it charges. Of course, this raises the question of whether a softer type of product market rivalry will change the pricing calculus of the resource supplier. The next section introduces such a setting in the form of the Cournot model.
Cournot rivalry and additive resources
A widely used method of modeling intermediate degrees of competition is found in the Cournot (1838) model, which in this section is applied to the SFM setup described above. Unlike the 
The resource is therefore overpriced: when both firms acquire it, it increases their product market profits relative to the original situation by an amount which is smaller than the resource price, and therefore they earn negative SFM rents, i.e. 
firm's competitive advantage will lead to maintenance of this advantage, as both firms acquire the resource and reduce their marginal costs by the same amount. This will have a negative effect on the performance of both firms, since they will play a Prisoner's Dilemma game against one another and acquire the resource at a price above the product market rents it generates for them.
Why does the result of the Cournot model differ so much from Bertrand? An important feature of the Cournot model is that the firms may still earn positive profits when both of them acquire the resource (because they are shielded from mutual rivalry to a greater extent). This means that a Cournot rival facing a resource-acquiring competitor, unlike a Bertrand rival, will be willing to pay a positive price in order to reduce the advantage of its competitor, and the resource supplier takes advantage of this willingness. Of course, when both rivals pursue the same (individually optimal) purchasing strategy, they may both end up worse off. In that way, once the resource seller has set the low price, the availability of the resource to the firms at that price can be considered a 'Bertrand supertrap' in the sense that it is beneficial when it happens unilaterally to one firm but detrimental when it happens jointly to all firms in the industry (Cabral and VillasBoas, 2005) 4 .
An example that illustrates this type of dynamic is the rivalry between Boeing and Airbus and the challenges created for these firms by innovative engine designers. While each aircraft manufacturer has an incentive to improve its competitiveness by acquiring new, more fuelefficient engine designs, the result of both doing so may merely be that they cannibalize their existing aircraft designs and are left worse off than if they could conspire to extend the lifetime of these less efficient designs (Economist, 2010 a c   , it will no longer be optimal for the resource seller to price so low that both firms will buy, and instead the price is increased so that the strong firm is just willing to buy on its own.
The result is a divergence of the two firms like in the Bertrand additive model, leaving the strong firm equally well off after paying the resource price (while, unlike in the Bertrand case, the weak firm is worse off because its competitive disadvantage is increased). This shows that strong competitive advantages may change the effect of SFMs because they change the pricing calculus of resource suppliers. In particular, the strong firm's competitive advantage makes it attractive for the resource seller to switch from a low-price to a high-price strategy, and thereby serves as protection against being drawn into a Prisoner's Dilemma game with the weak firm.
Cournot rivalry and supplantive resources
The Cournot model with supplantive resources is similar to the one with additive resources in the sense that, as long as the competitive heterogeneity of the two firms is not too large, the resource seller will choose a low price and both firms will acquire the resource. An important difference, however, is that the two firms now end up with the same level of competitiveness, leading to the convergence outcome seen in Figure 2 (4). Their profits, furthermore, are lower than the strong firm's original profits, but may be lower or higher than those of the weak firm. In the case of the latter, it is clearly no longer a Prisoner's Dilemma game like in the additive model, because the weak firm gains as a consequence of the existence of the SFM. This counterintuitive result is captured by the following proposition: As shown by the proposition, the weak firm's positive SFM rents occur when it has a moderately strong initial competitive disadvantage ( 1 2 c a c   ). Hence, ironically, when SFMs for supplantive resources arise, it can in fact be an advantage to be at a competitive disadvantage.
PROPOSITION 4: Under product market Cournot rivalry, the existence of an SFM for a resource that is supplantive of the strong firm's competitive advantage will lead to convergence of the two firms' marginal costs and thus eliminate that advantage, as long as it is not too high compared to the strength of the resource ( a c 
The explanation is that a larger competitive disadvantage makes a supplantive resource more attractive for the weak firm (because it by definition eliminates any pre-existing disadvantage), but the resource supplier does not raise its price accordingly because it wants to sell to the strong firm as well. However, if this disadvantage becomes too large ( a c  ), the resource seller switches to a high-price strategy and prices at the weak firm's reservation price. In that case we get a leapfrogging NE where only the weak firm buys, overtaking the strong firm to become the new market leader as in the Bertrand supplantive model. While this may seem good for the weak firm, it is actually not, because the resource seller appropriates the entire value of the resource through the high price, leaving the weak firm with the same profits as before the SFM. The strong firm, on the other hand, loses profits because it is overtaken by the weak firm.
Resource characteristics and competitive outcomes
Having now covered both the Cournot and Bertrand models, we can say something more general about the difference between additive and supplantive resources and their associated competitive outcomes illustrated in Figure 2 . First, the weak firm always has the highest reservation price for a supplantive resource, leading to outcomes such as convergence and leapfrogging. This can be ascribed to the replacement effect: strong (incumbent) firms have less to gain from buying resources that supplant their existing advantage than weak (entrant) firms do (Arrow, 1962) .
Second, the strong firm always has the highest reservation for an additive resource, resulting in maintenance or divergence. This represents a new type of effect-one that could be called a 'competitive advantage effect' because it is driven by, and reinforces, such an advantage.
Although similar in spirit to Gilbert and Newbery (1982) 
The pricing of scale-free resources
As to SFM profits, the models above demonstrate that one of the most important determinants is the resource seller's choice between a high-price and a low-price strategy. The high-price strategy guarantees the resource-acquiring firm the same profits as it was earning before, as it will pay a price equal to the value of the resource. The low-price strategy, on the other hand, opens up for profits and losses because it leads both firms to buy, and the value of the resource to those two firms differs. This latter situation is one that, by definition, only applies to SFMs for scale-free resources, and it is therefore worthwhile to elaborate on its boundary conditions.
Essentially, these depend on the strength of the strong firm's pre-existing competitive advantage and of the product market rivalry between the two firms.
Competitive advantage. We saw in the Cournot model that the magnitude of the strong firm's competitive advantage determines whether the resource supplier chooses a low-price or a high-price strategy. We get a high-price strategy as soon as this advantage is over a certain level (defined by Propositions 3 and 4). The implication is that SFMs may create discontinuities or threshold effects in the returns to a competitive advantage, as shown in Figure 5 . *** Figure 5 about here ***
The left panel shows the profits of the strong firm as a function of its competitive advantage. In the absence of an SFM, these are steadily increasing in a as one would expect from an RBV logic. However, as soon as we introduce an SFM for an additive resource, we get a discontinuity:
the strong firm earns negative SFM profits for low levels of a, but as soon as this advantage reaches a certain threshold, the profits of the strong firm jumps back to pre-SFM levels because the resource seller switches to the high-price strategy and the Prisoner's Dilemma game gives way to divergence. A similar but more complicated situation exists for the weak firm when there is an SFM for a supplantive resource, as shown in the right panel. In the absence of an SFM, the profits of the weak firm are declining in a as its market share is diminished by an increasingly superior competitor. However, after introducing an SFM for a supplantive resource, the profits of the weak firm is initially lower but actually increases with a, eventually becoming larger than the pre-SFM profits (as captured by Proposition 4). However, when a becomes too large the resource seller switches to the high-price strategy, erasing the weak firm's SFM profits. Hence, a large competitive advantage is not only more likely than a small one to be compounded by an additive resource, but also more likely to be reversed by a supplantive one (while a small competitive advantage will often be maintained or diminished).
Product market rivalry. If product market rivalry between potential acquirers is strong enough (as in the Bertrand model), we tend to get a high-price strategy irrespectively of the size of the strong firm's competitive advantage. Intuitively, with strong product market rivalry it is difficult for both firms to be successful in the product market at the same time, making it less attractive for a firm to buy the resource as soon as it expects its opponent to do so as well. The resource seller can therefore extract higher revenues if it keeps its price so high that only one firm will acquire it. Ironically, this may be an advantage for the acquiring firm because it protects it from destructive resource acquisition games, suggesting that SFMs in fact also change the performance implications of product market rivalry, by making weak rivalry less attractive than it would otherwise be. This reinforces the points made by Makadok (2010) and Chatain and Zemsky (2011) , who showed that the returns to a resource advantage increase with the degree of product market rivalry. However, it also extends these studies by adding an SFM logic with endogenous resource pricing, showing that when a firm tries to procure such an advantage in SFMs for scale-free resources, it may either (1) fail to achieve the advantage because its rivals are pursuing the same strategy, (2) obtain the advantage but end up paying the full value of it, or (3) pay more than the full value of the advantage. The implication is that the economic impact of SFMs, and hence the managerial considerations raised by such markets, are inherently different from other modes of resource accumulation (such as natural endowment and proprietary development), and warrant the dedicated analysis effort that they are receiving. In fact, the above model can be changed to one of internal resource development by assuming, instead of an SFM price being set by a resource supplier, a development cost drawn randomly from a probability distribution (e.g. characterizing the costliness of 'hard' and 'easy' technologies). It is of course possible that such a cost, by chance, would coincide with the resource seller's revenuemaximizing SFM price, but it is arguably more likely that it would be so low that one or both firms could earn rents, or so high that no one would develop the resource. Hence, with internal development, rent-destroying resource acquisition games are not impossible but they would be unfortunate coincidences, whereas with SFMs they are almost inevitable predicaments for firms facing profit-maximizing resource suppliers.
COMMITTING TO RESOURCE SCARCITY
The four scenarios developed above were based on the assumption that the resource seller sold the scale-free resource to anyone wishing to buy it at the prevailing price. However, in some cases, resource sellers may try to strategically restrict the supply of their scale-free resources, creating an 'endogenous resource scarcity' in order to enhance the value of those resources. In practice, this could take the form of an exclusive license to a technology or a brand. For example, Lucasfilm has sold exclusive rights to use its characters in computer games to Electronic Arts, and Marvel has entered into a similar agreement with Activision. In the terminology of this paper, these companies are essentially taking a resource that is by nature scale-free (intellectual property), and making it 'artificially' (legally) non-scale-free.
To analyze how that possibility nuances the results derived above, this section extends the model by assuming that the resource supplier has an opportunity to strategically restrict the supply of the resource to one unit in advance of the timeline shown in Figure 1 . If it chooses to do so, the unique instance of the resource is subsequently offered for sale in a second-price, sealed-bid auction, where the two firms submit bids based on their expectation of the ensuing product market rivalry, and the winning firm acquires the resource at the price bid by its rival (an assumption that ensures honest bidding by the firms). The extension is developed formally in the online Appendix and the findings are summarized below.
Resource restriction under Bertrand rivalry. In the Bertrand model, it can be shown that the resource seller will never have an incentive to strategically restrict the supply of a resource that is additive to the strong firm's competitive advantage. On the other hand, the resource seller will get the same revenue from restricting the supply of a resource that is supplantive of the strong firm's competitive advantage (selling it to the strong firm), and not doing so (thus selling it to the weak firm). While this may seem surprising, it is actually a logical consequence of the fact that the weak firm has nothing to lose and therefore has the same reservation price in the auction and the base model. Intuitively, the resource seller is indifferent between selling the resource to the weak firm, thereby enabling it to leapfrog the strong firm, and selling the resource to the strong firm and enabling it to preempt that leapfrogging. The price that the strong firm pays for that preemption must be equal to the price that the weak firm would be willing to pay for the leapfrogging itself, because that is the highest price at which the resource seller maintains the credible (implicit) threat of selling to the weak firm instead.
If resource restriction takes place in the Bertrand supplantive model, the strong firm wins the auction at a price of
. This is lower than its pre-SFM profits  
by a magnitude of ac and thus implies negative SFM profits. Hence, the presence of the SFM and the decision of the resource supplier to restrict its supply leads the strong firm to suffer a performance penalty of ac that can be considered a 'preemption price premium', since it is the loss it is willing to incur in order to prevent its weaker rival from getting the resource (equivalently, this premium can be calculated by subtracting the value-in-use of the resource, Proposition 5 tells us that it is more attractive to restrict strong additive resources, as the strong firm is willing to pay a significant price premium to preempt the resource acquisition of its weaker rival. Hence, resource restriction occurs in the upper left part of the divergence area (bounded by the dotted line) in the left panel of Figure 6 . While this outcome protects the strong firm's competitive advantage, it does not protect its profits, which are reduced from their pre-SFM levels. Finally, the Cournot supplantive model is the most complicated one. As seen in the right panel of Figure 6 , three different competitive outcomes (convergence, divergence, and leapfrogging) are possible in that model when we allow for the possibility of resource restriction.
Proposition 6 tells us that the resource seller will exploit the strong firm, which is willing to pay a preemption price premium in order avoid leapfrogging, if the resource is sufficiently strong or the competitive advantage is large (the two divergence areas in Figure 6 ). However, it is also possible that the resource seller will restrict the resource in order to sell the resource to the weak firm, with similar negative performance consequences (the upper part of the leapfrogging area in the figure).
Contingencies for resource restriction
In general, as demonstrated by this extension, supplantive resources are more likely to be restricted than additive ones, and especially so when one of the firms has a strong competitive advantage. Also, resource restriction is likely to occur when the resource is strong relative to the preexisting competitive asymmetry in the product market. The intuition is that when a strong resource that is supplantive of a large competitive advantage is offered for sale, the strong firm has a lot to lose, and the weak firm a lot to win, by buying it. This intensifies the bidding contest between the two firms, to the benefit of the resource supplier. The strong firm is most likely to 'win' this contest as it is willing to pay a high price to preempt resource acquisition by a weaker competitor. Returning to the example in the beginning of this section, this may explain why the two market-leading electronic game producers have been able to acquire exclusive licenses to inherently scale-free intellectual property (Activision to Marvel-based games and Electronic Arts to Star Wars-based games). While these firms arguably already have very strong proprietary content development capabilities, signing exclusive licenses effectively prevents smaller competitors from using SFM content to catch up or leapfrog them. In light of that fact, it seems plausible that the resource suppliers (Marvel and Lucasfilm) can maximize their revenues by following a strategy of endogenous resource scarcity, at the expense of the overbidding firms.
An important aspect of such resource restriction is that it can reverse the competitive result of SFMs by changing leapfrogging into divergence outcomes. A supplantive resource which would otherwise be sold to the weak firm (who has the most to gain from buying it) may end up, as a consequence of scarcity, being sold to the strong firm (who has the most to lose from not buying it). One reason for this is that, as soon as the resource seller commits to scarcity, Gilbert and Newbery's (1982) efficiency effect becomes relevant: the acquiring firm can now preempt the resource-acquisition of its rival, and we know that the incumbent's incentive to preempt is always larger than the entrant's incentive to enter (Tirole, 2003: 392-394 )-a logic that extends to the strong and weak firms in this model. This may explain why exclusive licenses are sometimes perceived as anticompetitive devices (see, for example, Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1988 ) and may therefore be subject to legal constraints. For example, the National Football League (NFL) was sued for anticompetitive behavior as a consequence of issuing an exclusive license allowing Reebok to produce NFL-branded apparel, and Electronic Arts for using exclusive licensing with the NFL and other organizations to prevent competitors from entering the market for interactive football software. Indeed, in the present model, resource restriction is never good for consumers (ceteris paribus), as it leads either to lower NE quantities (in Cournot) or to a less contestable market with a higher limit price (in Bertrand). On the other hand, this model does not consider the effect of the resource scarcity option on the resource supplier's incentive to develop the resource in the first place.
CONCLUSIONS
In his seminal paper, Barney (1986) identified the conditions under which the price of an SFM resource would be bid up to its economic value. This paper adds to that idea by demonstrating that the (appropriable) economic value of a resource is a moving target that depends on an interaction of: (1) the synergies between the resource and the acquiring firm, (2) the type of product market rivalry facing that firm, (3) the actions of product market rivals in the SFM, (4) the pre-existing competitive (dis)advantage of the firm, and (5) the potential of the resource to disrupt or sustain that pre-existing asymmetry. The first of these determinants is present in the models by Makadok (2001) , Makadok and Barney (2001) , and Adegbesan (2009) , and the second and third in Chatain (2013) ; the rest are new to the SFM conversation.
One of the key contributions of this paper to that conversation is thereby to show the asymmetric effect of SFMs on strong and weak firms. This analysis also provides insights of potential interest to innovation and IO scholars. In particular, it moves beyond the incumbententrant dichotomy to show that competitively advantaged firms will acquire additive resources in SFMs while competitively disadvantaged firms will acquire supplantive ones, and to explore how the size of the pre-existing competitive gap between the firms interacts with the nature of the resource and the type of product market rivalry to discriminate between possible outcomes.
These outcomes, in turn, are not restricted to the persistence or disruption of monopoly, but include more subtle changes to competitive relations such as convergence, divergence, leapfrogging, and maintenance. As such, this paper can be seen as a first step towards integrating IO thinking (Arrow, 1962; Gilbert and Newbery, 1982) with recent advances in RBV thinking (e.g. Makadok, 2010; Chatain, 2013) .
At the same time, the consequences of these outcomes for firm performance are both surprising and sobering for the implicated firms. For example, when the strong firm increases its competitive advantage by buying an additive resource, and when the weak firm overtakes the strong firm by buying a supplantive one, all incremental product market rents are appropriated by the resource seller. Worse, if the seller can entice both firms to acquire the resource at the same time-or if it can restrict the resource and thereby inspire the firms to compete for it-the acquiring firms will lose some of their pre-existing market power rents. In these scenarios, the SFM behavior is a direct extension of the product market rivalry between the firms, suggesting that we cannot separate the two. Indeed, we saw initially that negative SFM profit could never occur for a product market monopolist, who would buy the resource only if the price was below the economic value of implementing it. It is when SFMs are also open to one's product market rivals, that there is a risk of rents being destroyed in a negative-sum resource-acquisition game.
These results are indicative of the way in which SFMs create a disconnect between competitive advantage and performance, suggesting that product market leadership-a prize coveted by most managers-may not be as attractive as sometimes believed. This reinforces Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky's (2007: 664) point that "the association between resource asymmetry and superior performance need not be tautological … once one accounts for the cost of resource development." When that cost is an endogenously determined SFM price, the association largely breaks down. An example which may illustrate this conundrum can be found in the mobile phone industry, where new supplantive resources have enabled firms like HTC,
LG, and Sony to leapfrog Nokia, but without making any economic profit by doing so, because the value created by these firms have largely been appropriated by consumers and by resource suppliers on the hardware and software side (e.g. ARM Holdings, Qualcomm, and Google), similar to the scenario predicted by Proposition 2.
This disconnect also has important implications for the hypothesized positive correlation between resource possession and firm performance, which has so far received mixed support in empirical studies. As noted by Newbert (2007: 141) "firms may often fail to appropriate all of the value they create and, thus, the resource-based rents they earn may not accurately reflect the advantages they have attained." The models presented in this paper support this idea and suggest that empirical scholars should therefore try to capture whether a given resource is acquired (implying that appropriability is low) or developed internally (implying that it is high). A complicating factor, furthermore, is that firms report aggregate profits    . This causes a particular challenge when using resource possession as predictor, because it is not an exogenous one. For example, in the Bertrand model in this paper, additive resources will only be acquired by firms with pre-existing competitive advantages, and empirically we would therefore find firms possessing an additive SFM resource to have superior performance-but this effect would be spurious as it would be entirely driven by their preexisting competitive advantage rather than by the resource itself (which would be priced exactly at its economic value). Hence, failing to control for all the resources and capabilities possessed by a firm-a difficult task indeed-may result in an endogeneity problem when assessing the performance implications of specific SFM resources. To circumvent this problem, a more direct test of the performance implications of SFMs could use resource acquisition rather than resource possession as independent variable, deploying an event study methodology, for example, to regress abnormal stock market returns on the announcements of licensing agreements.
Scale-free resources and performance
Whereas Levinthal and Wu (2010) have demonstrated the implications of scale-free resources for diversification, this paper demonstrates the implications of such resources for competitive advantage and performance. These implications, in turn, depend crucially on the choices made by the resource seller: whether it sets a low or a high price for the resource, or, alternatively, artificially restricts the supply of the resource. Importantly, these choices are unique to sellers of scale-free resources, since non-scale-free ones by definition are already restricted and can only be sold to one firm-and will be priced at the willingness to pay of that firm. Interestingly, it turns out that the resource seller sometimes has an interest in making a scale-free resource nonscale-free and that this leads to exactly the same overbidding phenomenon described by Chatain (2013)-only in a more extreme form since in the present model it always leads to negative SFM profits. In that sense, the extension of the model is a step towards integration of the research streams focusing on these two types of resources, as it essentially endogenizes the 'scalefreeness' of the SFM resource. However, this only reinforces the robustness of the main conclusion from the base model: even with possible resource restriction, firms may still end up acquiring the same overpriced resource in a Prisoner's Dilemma game and using it against one another in product market competition. This will tend to happen when product market rivalry is not too intense, the acquiring firms are not too heterogeneous, and the resource is not too strong-in which case it will be in the interest of the resource seller to fully exploit the scale-free property of the resource.
While endogenizing key variables such as resource quantity and price, this paper still leaves a number of important factors for future work to explore. An example is the pre-existing competitive advantage of the strong firm, which could be modeled as an outcome of previous SFMs and internal resource development in a dynamic setting. The model also speaks to the interplay between resource building and resource buying (Adegbesan, 2009; Maritan and Peteraf, 2011) , suggesting that firms with certain types of resources will benefit more (or lose less) than others from SFMs, and this could influence their incentives to obtain competitive advantages in advance of such SFMs by, for example, investing in advertising or R&D. Finally, the properties of the SFM resource itself are determined outside of the present model, leaving open questions such as when resource suppliers will strive to develop additive or supplantive resources, and when they will develop strong or weak ones. Based on the models in this paper it is possible to say that strong and supplantive resources provide higher revenues to the resource seller than weak and additive resources do, but as these are also presumably the most costly and difficult types of resources to develop, we need a specific cost function for the resource supplier (see e.g. Chatain, 2013) to be more precise about this issue.
Nevertheless, this paper aims to contribute to a nascent (or resurgent) stream of literature.
At a high level, it can be seen as supporting the idea that it is useful to combine product and factor market perspectives in an RBV context (Priem and Butler, 2001, Leiblein, 2011) and, in particular, that we must be careful when generalizing about the impact of SFMs without explicitly specifying the type of product market rivalry faced by the resource-acquiring firms.
Future work may take these ideas into account so as to further advance our knowledge about competitive advantage and performance. + a)c will be the revenue-maximizing price.
1 This means that only the weak firm will get the resource, thereby leapfrogging the strong firm to become the market leader. However, both firms end up with 0 profit, as the resource is priced exactly at its value for the weak firm, and as the strong firm is priced out of the product market and thereby loses its prior rents of 1 2 a.
Product Market Cournot Rivalry with Additive Resources
In the Cournot model, when neither firm buys the resource or the SFM does not exist, the firms' profits are π M 1 = 1 36
(1 + 4a)
2 and π M 2 = 1 36
(1 − 2a) 2 . As the resource lowers the marginal cost by c, these expressions can be used to find the solutions when only the strong firm acquires the resource (π 1 = (1 + 4a − 2c) 2 and π 2 = 1 36
(1 − 2a + 4c) 2 − p); and when they both acquire the resource (π 1 = 1 36
(1 + 4a + 2c) 2 − p and π 2 = 1 36
(1 − 2a + 2c) 2 − p). Based on these expressions it is possible to find the reservation prices of each firm given the action of its rival. If the weak firm does not buy, the strong firm's BR is to buy the resource if
